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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

In the Matter of the
Discipline of:

:

PETER ENNENGA, #0999

:

Case No. 20000476-SC

RESPONDENT.

:

Priority No. 5

REPLY AND CROSS APPEAL BRIEF OF APPELLEE/CROSS
APPELLANT
JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah
Constitution Article VIII, Section 4: Utah Code §78-2-2-(3)(c).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
WHETHER THE COURT IMPOSED THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF DISCIPLINE
AND WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING RESPONDENT'S EX
POST FACTO CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT.
The standard of review on the issue of whether the appropriate level of
discipline has been imposed is the "clearly erroneous standard". The Appellate Court
is permitted to draw its own inferences from the trial court's factual determinations
which are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard.

While serious

considerations are to be given to the rulings and factual findings of the disciplinary

court, the appellate court may make an independent judgment regarding the
appropriate level of discipline if the evidence warrants. See In Re Pendleton, 2000
UT 77,1J20. Citing In Re Stubbs 974 P.2d 296 (Utah 1999) and In Re Knowlton 800
P.2d 806, 809 (Utah 1990). The standard of review on the cross appeal issue
regarding Mr. Ennenga's ex post facto claim is one of "correctness." The appellate
court decides the matter without any deference to the trial judge's determination of
law. State v. Maauire 975 P.2d 476, 478 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).
Mr. Ennenga's constitutional ex post facto argument was preserved in the trial
court by his having filed a Memorandum Regarding Sanctions and through closing
argument. (R342-363).
DETERMINATIVE RULES
The following Rules contained in the Standards for Imposing Lawyers'
Sanctions will need to be reviewed as part of the considerations in this appeal. The
relevant Rules are:
Rule 3. Factors to be considered in imposing sanctions.
3.1.

Generally.

The following factors should be considered in imposing a sanctions after a
finding of lawyer misconduct;
(a) the duty violated;
(b) the lawyer's mental state;
(c) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct;
and,
(d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.

2

Rule 4. Imposition of Sanctions.
4.1. Generally.
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the
factors set out in Standard 3.1, the following sanctions are generally appropriate.
4.2. Disbarment.
Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
a. knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule
8.4(a),(d), (e) or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct with the intent to benefit the
lawyer or another or to deceive the Court, and causes serious or potentially serious
injury to a party, the public or the legal system or causes serious or potentially
serious interference with a legal proceeding; or
b. engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary element of which
includes intentional interference with the administration of justice, false swearing,
misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misappropriation or theft; or the sale, distribution,
or importation of controlled substances; or the intentional killing of another; or an
attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit any of these offenses; or
c. engages in any other intentional misconduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's
fitness to practice law.
4.3 Suspension.
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
a. knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a),
(d), (e) or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and causes injury or potential
injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or causes interference or potential
interference with a legal proceeding; or
b. engages in criminal conduct that does not contain the elements listed in
Standard 4.2(b) but nevertheless seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness
to practice law.
4.4 Reprimand.
Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
a. negligently engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule
8.4(a), (d), (e) or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and causes injury or
potential injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or causes interference or
potential interference with a legal proceeding; or
b. engages in any other misconduct that involves dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation and that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to
3

practice law.
4.5 Admonition.
Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
a. negligently engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule
8.4(a), (d), (e) or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and causes little or no
injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or interference with a legal
proceeding, but exposes a party, the public, or the legal system to potential injury or
causes potential interference with a legal proceeding; or
b. engages in any professional misconduct not otherwise identified in
this Standard 4 that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.
Rule 6.

Aggravation and Mitigation.

6.1. Generally.
After misconduct has been established, aggravating and mitigating
circumstances may be considered and weighted in deciding what sanctions to
impose.
6.2 Aggravating circumstances.
Aggravating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may justify
an increase in the degree of discipline to the imposed. Aggravating circumstances
may include:
a.
Prior record of discipline;
b.
Dishonest or selfish motive;
c.
A pattern of misconduct;
d.
Multiple offenses;
e.
Obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing
to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary authority;
f.
submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive
practices during the disciplinary process;
g.
refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct
involved either to the client or to the disciplinary authority;
h.
vulnerability of victim;
i.
substantial experience in the practice of law;
j.
lack of good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the
consequences of the misconduct involved; and
k.
illegal conduct, including the use of controlled substances.
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6.3 Mitigating circumstances.
Mitigating circumstances are any consideration or factors that may justify a
reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. Mitigating circumstances may
include:
a.
absence of a prior record of discipline;
b.
absence of a dishonest or selfish motive;
c.
personal or emotional problems;
d.
timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the
consequences of the misconduct involved;
e.
full and free disclosure to the client or the disciplinary authority
prior to the discovery of any misconduct or cooperative attitude toward proceedings;
f.
inexperience in the practice of law;
g.
good character or reputation;
h.
physical disability;
i.
mental disability or impairment, including substance abuse when;
(1)

The respondent is affected by a substance abuse or mental

disability; and,
(2) The substance abuse or mental disability causally
contributed to the misconduct; and,
(3) The respondent's recovery from the substance abuse or
mental disability is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful
rehabilitation; and,
(4) The recovery arrested the misconduct and the recurrence
of that misconduct is unlikely;
j.
unreasonable delay in disciplinary proceedings, provided that the
respondent did not substantially contribute to the delay and provided further that the
respondent has demonstrated prejudice resulting from the delay;
k.
interim reform in circumstances not involving mental disability or
impairment;
I.
imposition of other penalties or sanctions;
m.
remorse; and
n.
remoteness of prior offenses.
6.4 Factors which are neither aggravating nor mitigating.
The following circumstances should not be considered as either aggravating
or mitigation:
a.
forced or compelled restitution;
b.
withdrawal of complaint against the lawyer;
c.
resignation prior to completion of disciplinary proceedings;
5

d.
e.

complainant's recommendation as to sanctions; and
failure of injured client to complain.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE.
This is a case involving attorney discipline. The Office of Professional

Conduct has appealed the trial court's suspension of attorney Peter M. Ennenga,
claiming that the appropriate level of discipline should have been disbarment. The
respondent has filed a cross appeal claiming that the trial court erred in failing to
consider his constitutional ex post facto argument relative to the appropriate level
of discipline.
II.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS.
The Office of Professional Conduct filed its initial complaint against Mr.

Ennenga on August 1997. (R1-68). An amended complaint was filed September 12,
1997. (R145-165). Mr. Ennenga filed timely answers to both. (R69-72 & R166170).
On August 7,1998, the Office of Professional Conduct filed a motion for partial
summary judgment with supporting memorandum. (R172-186). Mr. Ennenga filed
his memorandum in opposition to the motion for partial summary judgment on
August 20, 1998. (R189-192)
On September 18, 1998, the Court entered its minute entry granting partial
summary judgment as to counts 4, 5, 8 & 13 but denying summary judgment on the
6

balance of the counts. (R208).
On November 9, 1998, the Office of Professional Conduct filed its formal
Order relative to the Court's minute entry. (R214-215). Mr. Ennenga filed an
objection to that Order on the grounds that the reason for the Court's denial on some
of the counts had equal applicability on some of the counts to which summary
judgment had been granted. (R212-213),
It was not until October 26,1999 that the objections as to the partial summary
judgment order were resolved and an amended order was entered by the Office of
Professional Conduct. (R268-269). Summary Judgment was only granted on Courts
8 and 13.
The trial on the factual allegations was held January 11, 2000 following which
the Court entered a Memorandum Decision dated January 18, 2000 issuing Findings
of Fact and concluding that Mr. Ennenga had violated certain rules of professional
conduct. (R309-314).
A sanctions hearing was conducted on March 28, 2000. At the sanctions
hearing, Mr. Ennenga filed his Memorandum Regarding Sanctions which, among
other things, asserted that his discipline should be viewed by the standard of
discipline that was in place and utilized at the time of his misconduct as opposed to
standards which were adopted subsequent to his misconduct.
III.

DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT.
On April 3, 2000, the Court issued is memorandum decision relative to the
7

sanctions and suspended Mr. Ennenga from the practice of law for a period of six
months. As a part of those Findings and Conclusions, the Court concluded that Mr.
Ennenga's ex post facto argument was contrary to case law and not persuasive.
(R365-375).
Formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were prepared by the Office
of Professional Conduct. (R376-382). The Office of Professional Conduct then filed
this appeal objecting to the level of discipline imposed and Mr. Ennenga filed his
cross appeal objecting to the Court's failure to consider his constitutional ex post
facto argument.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The First Amended Complaint filed by the Office of Professional Conduct on
September 12,1997 made factual allegations on four different matters. (R145-165).
(THE WILSON MATTER)
It was alleged that in the spring of 1991, JoAnn Wilson retained Mr. Ennenga
to collect various overdue accounts for her. On or about May 26,1992, Ms. Wilson
executed a release and received the sum of $18,000.00 which she requested that
Mr. Ennenga hold in trust. Ms. Wilson did not file an informal complaint with the
Office of Professional Conduct until May 30, 1996. The notice of that informal
complaint was not sent to Mr. Ennenga until October 29,1996. A screening panel
heard the Wilson matter on January 30,1997 and voted to issue a formal complaint.
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(THE YARBIL MATTER)
Tanner Yarbil alleged that he retained Mr. Ennenga on or about June 3, 1993
on a contingency fee basis to represent him in a civil action against Logan
Manufacturing company. An informal complaint was not filed by Tanner Yarbil until
April 13,1995. The notice of that informal complaint was not sent to Mr. Ennenga
until October 11, 1995. A screening panel heard the Yarbil matter on February 6,
1996 and voted to issue a formal complaint.
(THE DURRANT-FUNK MATTER)
Although summary judgment was granted as to Count 13 of the Bar's First
Amended Complaint (R268), an allegation that Mr. Ennenga failed to respond to the
Bar's request for information on this matter, the substantive allegations were
dismissed by the Office of Professional Conduct at the beginning of the trial and
should be of no further relevance. (R306).
(THE GLOVER MATTER)
The trial court concluded that this matter was time barred by the statute of
limitations. (R313).
(COURT PROCEEDINGS)
On August 7, 1998, approximately one year after the formal Complaint was
filed, the Office of Professional Conduct filed a Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment with supporting memorandum. (R172-186). On that same day, the Office
of Professional Conduct filed Interrogatories and Requests for Production of
9

Documents or Things. (R187-188).
On August 20,1998, Mr. Ennenga filed his Memorandum in Opposition to the
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (R189-192)
On August 25,1998, the Office of Professional Conduct filed its reply. (R193201).
On September 9,1998, the Office of Professional Conduct filed its notice to
submit for decision. (R202-204).
On September 18, 1998, the Court entered its minute entry granting partial
summary judgment as to counts 4, 5, 8 & 13 but denying summary judgment on the
balance of the counts. (R208).
On November 9,1998, the Office of Professional Conduct prepared and filed
its formal order relative to the Court's minute entry. (R214-215). Mr. Ennenga filed
an objection to that order on the grounds that the reason for denial on some of the
counts had equal applicability on some of the counts to which summary judgment
had been granted. (R212-213).
It was not until October 26,1999 that the objections as to the partial summary
judgment order were resolved and an amended order was entered by the Office of
Professional Conduct. (R268-269). Summary Judgment was only granted on Courts
8 and 13.
While it is true that Mr. Ennenga did not answer the discovery requests until
March 23,1999, (R245), the Office of Professional Conduct was not prejudiced by
10

that delay since the Summary Judgment dispute had still not been resolved. Mr.
Ennenga's delay did not materially contribute to the overall delay of these
proceedings.
A trial on the factual allegations was held on January 11, 2000 following which
the Court entered a memorandum decision dated January 18, 2000 with Findings of
Fact and concluding that Mr. Ennenga had violated rules of professional conduct.
(R309-314).
The allegations in OPC's First Amended Complaint relative to the DurrantFunk matter, were dismissed by the Court at the beginning of the trial since the Bar
announced its intention not to pursue those allegations. (R306). The allegations
regarding the Rodney Glover matter, were dismissed by the Court as being barred
by the statute of limitations. (R313).
The trial court found that Mr. Ennenga failed to timely respond to the OPC's
request for information on the Wilson, Yarbil and Glover complaints, and had earlier
entered summary judgment on Mr. Ennenga's failure to timely respond to the OPC's
request for information on the Durrant-Funk complaint. The Court further found that
Mr. Ennenga failed to inform Tanner Yarbil that he was no longer going to pursue the
matter that Mr. Yarbil had retained him to pursue1. The real issue in this appeal over

'It is a little unclear how the trial court made its findings relative to the Tanner Yarbil
complaint since Tanner Yarbil did not testify at the trial. Since it is doubtful that the Bar would
be pursuing Mr. Ennenga's disbarment based upon the Tanner Yarbil allegations, Mr.
Ennenga has chosen not to appeal the Court's findings relative to this Count.
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the appropriate level of discipline is premised only upon the Mary Wilson complaint.
Absent the Mary Wilson findings, disbarment would not be a discipline available for
consideration.
Focusing then on the JoAnn Wilson allegations, the trial court entered these
specific Findings of Fact.
"2.
In approximately the spring of 1991 JoAnn Wilson retained the
respondent to collect various amounts owed her, including a sum in the approximate
amount of $18,000 owed to her business from Thomas E. Soderberg.
3.
Respondent collected $18,000 from Thomas E. Soderberg on or about
May 21, 1992.
4.
On approximately May 26,1992, Wilson requested that Ennenga hold
the $18,000 in an interest-bearing escrow account.
5.
Respondent never deposited said money in any trust or escrow account,
but in October of 1992 deposited a portion of Wilson's money into his personal
checking account, retaining the balance in the form of a cashier's check.
6.

Respondent spent all of Wilson's money for personal purposes.

7.
In April, 1993, Wilson's accountant requested an accounting of the
money from respondent, and respondent failed to provide it.
8.
Wilson made several attempts to contact respondent regarding her
money and respondent either failed to respond or promised payment, which he failed
to do.
9.
Wilson filed an informal Complaint against respondent with the OPC on
May 30,1996.
10.

Respondent did not pay Wilson her money until June of 1997.
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11. Respondent used his position as Wilson's attorney and fiduciary to
obtain possession of Wilson's money.
12. Respondent breached his fiduciary duty and converted Wilson's funds
for his own use without her permission or knowledge."
The matter then proceeded to a sanctions hearing which was held March 28,
2000. Thereafter, the Court issued its Memorandum Decision suspending Mr.
Ennenga from the practice of law for a period of six months. (R365-374).
The Court's Memorandum Decision regarding the sanction to be imposed
considered each of the factors anticipated by the Rules.
Pursuant to Rule 3 of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, after a
Court has entered a finding of lawyer misconduct, these factors are to be considered
in imposing sanctions:
a.

The duty violated;

b.

The lawyer's mental state;

c.

The potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and,

d.

The existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.
A. THE DUTY VIOLATED

The duties of lawyers are specifically stated in the Rules of Professional
Conduct. Any violation of a rule will be considered as a lawyer having violated a
duty. In this case, the Court found Mr. Ennenga violated his duty to provide the OPC
with information, failed to communicate with Tanner Yarbil and breached his
fiduciary duty to Mary Wilson.
13

B. THE LAWYER'S MENTAL STATE
With respect to Mr. Ennenga's mental state, the Court found that:
"The reason that Mr. Ennenga misappropriated Ms. Wilson's
money was that he had a history of poor business practices in
connection with his law practice which resulted in his personal
financial situation being such that he could not make his
mortgage payments when due. This objective financial situation
was coupled with Mr. Ennenga's subjective inability to inform his
wife and children that he was not meeting his financial
obligations. Mr. Ennenga knew that Ms. Wilson was not going to
require immediate payment of her funds to her, and he stalled
her when she started requesting the fund by avoiding discussion
of the fund's whereabouts or the specific time that he would remit
them to her. Mr. Ennenga testified that he didn't want to lie to
Ms. Wilson, but he didn't want to admit that he had taken the
funds and no longer had them either. He further testified that he
had many thousands of dollars outstanding in the form of
accounts receivable and from the time that he took the $18,000
he believed he would be able to replace it with interest and pay
Ms. Wilson her funds when she required them."
C. THE POTENTIAL OR ACTUAL INJURY CAUSED
BY THE LAWYER'S MISCONDUCT
The Court found that since Tanner Yarbil did not testify, no evidence was
present to show that he suffered any actual injury.
With respect to JoAnn Wilson, the evidence presented showed that after Mary
Wilson filed her informal complaint with the OPC in May 1996 but before the Bar
filed its first formal Complaint in August 1997, Bar counsel, Kate Toomey, was
advised by Mary Wilson's lawyer by letter dated July 2,1997, that Mr. Ennenga had
repaid her the $18,000 without the necessity of a law suit having been filed.
Additionally, he paid her an amount that exceeded what she could have been
14

expected to collect with a judgment rate of interest plus all attorney fees that she
incurred to get the amount collected. (Respondent's Exhibit 1 - JoAnn Wilson
testimony T12-14). Accordingly, the Court found no injury.
P. THE EXISTENCE OF AGGRAVATING OR MITIGATING FACTORS
These factors as found by the Court are discussed in greater detail below.
The

Court

then

concluded

that

absent

aggravating

or

mitigating

circumstances, Rule 4 of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions would, under
the facts of this case, involve a presumptive sanction of disbarment.
The Court then went to the "next step in the analysis" and considered the
existence of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances listed in Rule 6.
Rule 6 of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions provides that the Court
should weigh any aggravating and mitigating circumstances in deciding which
sanction to impose.
With respect to the aggravating circumstances listed in Rule 6.2, the Court
found as follows:
"(a).

Prior record of discipline. There was prior discipline, but not of the

same nature as the Wilson misconduct."2

2

lt should be noted that the OPC had no knowledge of any prior discipline
regarding Mr. Ennenga. The Sanctions Hearing Brief given to the Court by the Bar at
the start of the sanctions hearing, specifically stated that Mr. Ennenga had no prior
discipline. This would have been a mitigating factor. Mr. Ennenga volunteered in his
sanctions hearing testimony that he had received two reprimands in the late 1980's in
connection with failing to file pleadings. (Sanctions Hearing P-16).
15

"(b). Dishonest or selfish motive. Mr. Ennenga's act was to benefit himself
and his family.
(c).

A pattern of misconduct.

The Court does not find a pattern of

misconduct in this matter, excepting his reluctance to participate in the disciplinary
process against him.
(d).

Multiple offenses. While consideration of the rules violated would seem

to indicate multiple offenses, it is the trial court's perspective that there were minor
offenses and one stand-alone serious offense, namely, the Wilson matter.
(e).

Obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to

comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary authority. Mr. Ennenga admits this.
(f).

Submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive

practices during the disciplinary process. This has apparently not occurred.
(g).

Refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct involved,

either to the client or to the disciplinary authority. Mr. Ennenga has admitted the
wrongful nature of the misconduct, has explained his involvement completely, and
expresses sincere remorse and has been remorseful since the misconduct took
place. He, however, did not openly admit any of these things until shortly before the
trial.
(h).

Vulnerability of victim.

Neither Mr. Yarbil nor Ms. Wilson were
16

particularly vulnerable. Mr. Wilson, in fact, made the misconduct too easy.
(i).

Substantial experience in the practice of law.

Mr. Ennenga has

practiced law for some 30 years, but it was only 21 years to the date of the
misappropriation of funds.
Q).

Lack of good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the

consequences of the misconduct involved. Mr. Ennenga has made full restitution,
but did not do so until he was under duress.
(k).

Illegal conduct, including the use of controlled substances. The only

illegal conduct that occurred here was the misappropriation of funds."
The Court then considered the mitigating factors of Rule 6.3 and found:
"(a)

Absence of a prior record of discipline. As stated above, there is a prior

record of discipline, but less significant than 8.4 and not of the same sort of
misconduct.
(b)

Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive. Not the case here.

(c)

Personal or emotional problems. Mr. Ennenga was suffering personal

and emotional problems as a result of his inability to meet his regular financial
obligations.
(d)

Timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the

consequences of the misconduct involved. Mr. Ennenga's effort was not particularly
timely, but he did completely rectify the consequences to Ms. Wilson.
(e)

Full and free disclosure to the client or the disciplinary authority prior to
17

the discovery of any misconduct, or cooperative attitude toward proceedings. This
did not occur.
(f)

Inexperience in the practice of the law. Not applicable.

(g)

Good character or reputation. Two attorneys in good standing and two

clients of Mr. Ennenga's testified that they believed despite the facts of the instant
case, that Mr. Ennenga was a fine attorney with an outstanding reputation for
honesty.
(h)

Physical disability. Not applicable.

(i)

Mental disability or impairment. Not applicable.

0)

Unreasonable delay in the disciplinary proceedings provided that Mr.

Ennenga did not substantially contribute to the delay and provided further that Mr.
Ennenga has demonstrated prejudice resulting from the delay. There was a
significant delay in this matter. While Ms. Wilson did not file her complaint against
the respondent until 1996, other complaints with respect to other matters referred to
above were filed in 1993. The OPC has been conducting an investigation into this
matter since 1993, and only filed its Complaint in August of 1997, and its First
Amended Complaint in September of 1997. Mr. Ennenga certainly didn't facilitate
moving the case forward on a faster track in his refusal to provide information to the
Bar through the discovery process, but the delay is attributable as much or more to
the OPC as it is to Ennenga. Mr. Ennenga has not demonstrated prejudice resulting
from the delay.
18

(k)

Interim reform.

Mr. Ennenga has not had any valid complaints filed

against him regarding misconduct after 1992.
(I)

Imposition of other penalties or sanctions. The Court is aware of no

other penalties or sanctions Mr. Ennenga has suffered.
(m)

Remorse. As stated above, Mr. Ennenga is very remorseful and has

been since the 1992 misconduct.
(n)

Remoteness of prior offenses.

Prior offenses are not particularly

significant, but are also not particularly remote in time."
The Court then concluded from this analysis that the mitigating circumstances
outweighed the aggravating circumstances. The Bar has appealed this conclusion
claiming that the trial judge should have disbarred Mr. Ennenga rather than impose
the six month suspension.3
At the sanctions hearing, Mr. Ennenga filed his memorandum regarding
sanctions which, among other things, asserted that his discipline should be viewed
by the standards of discipline that were in place and being utilized at the time of his
misconduct as opposed to standards that were adopted subsequent to his
misconduct. The Court found that this argument was contrary to case law and not

3

The Order of Suspension signed by Judge Henroid was dated May 1, 2000.
Pursuant to Rule 26 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability, that Order of
Suspension became effective on June 1, 2000 and would therefore end on December
1, 2000. By the time this appeal is decided, Mr. Ennenga will have served his six
month suspension period and will be entitled to reinstatement pursuant to the
conditions of Rule 24 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability.
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persuasive.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly evaluated and applied the Rule 3 factors to be
considered in imposing a sanction and the Rule 6 factors in aggravation and
mitigation. More importantly, if the standards of discipline actually being utilized
when Mr. Ennenga's misconduct occurred, were applied to his case, the level of
discipline may well have been less severe.
ARGUMENT
ISSUE ON APPEAL
WHETHER THE COURT IMPOSED THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF DISCIPLINE.
The Bar argues that the trial court gave undue weight to factors that were not
particularly compelling. The Bar claims that "recent case law" compels a conclusion
of disbarment. The Bar overlooks the fact that the Court reviewed each of those
"recent" cases, and concluded that weighing the misconduct of Mr. Ennenga against
the misconduct of the attorneys in the prior cases, "shows a significant difference in
the seriousness of the conduct, both as to the number of incidents, the motive of the
attorney, and the time elapsed between misconduct and sanction." (Memorandum
Decision on Sanctions. P-9). This evaluation of relative severity of conduct was
appropriate, correct and anticipated by the "recent case law" referenced by the Bar.
The Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
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were adopted by the Supreme Court by minute entry in May 1993 and became
effective July 1,1993. The first case decided by the Utah Supreme Court following
the adoption of those new Rules was In Re Babilis 951 P.2d 207 (Utah 1997). Since
this was the first reported attorney discipline case handled under the new Rules, it
was this Court's first application of Rule 4 and first consideration of the weighing of
aggravating and mitigating factors under Rule 6. In Babilis. the Court concluded as
a matter of future principle, the general rule would be that "intentional
misappropriation of client funds will result in disbarment unless the lawyer can
demonstrate truly compelling mitigating circumstances."
Indeed, there have been four Utah Supreme Court published discipline cases
including Babilis, since the utilization of the new Standards and Rules.4 In each
case, the trial judge imposed a discipline less serious than disbarment and in each
case, the Supreme Court reversed and concluded that the appropriate discipline was
disbarment.
In addition to Babilis. those cases are:
In Re Ince 957 P.2d 1233 (Utah 1998);
In Re Tanner 960 P.2d 399 (Utah 1998); and,
In Re Stubbs 974 P.2d 296 (Utah 1999)
It was these four cases that the trial court specifically noted when comparing

4

A fifth case, In Re Pendleton, 2000 UT 77, was recently issued but is not helpful
here since it was a case dealing with a lawyer's criminal conviction and distribution of
drugs.
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the relative misconduct of Mr. Ennenga. As noted by the Court, the attorney
misconduct in each of these cases, was more egregious than Mr. Ennenga's
misconduct.
In Babilis, the Court found that Babilis took $78,659.43 from his client's estate
without authorization, intentionally failed to account for assets of the estate, billed the
estate for non existent and over charged expenses in the sum of $14,122.00 when
there were only documented expenses of $775.00 and had set up a practice in his
office where he routinely over billed clients. The conduct of Mr. Ennenga, while
falling under the same violation of duty as occurred with Mr. Babilis, was
considerably less severe, not repeated and not enhanced by other similar
misconduct as found in Babilis. In Babilis, the Court said that the difference between
sanctions of disbarment and suspension lies in the relative severity of the conduct,
at 212.
In Ince. his misconduct included forged warranty deeds and quit claim deeds
and misrepresentations to a bank for the use of pension funds; a long series of
actions involving misappropriations of funds belonging to his law firm of Callister,
Duncan and Nebeker; forging endorsements on checks; failing to deposit client funds
into trust accounts and generally engaging in a long series of transactions involving
false documents, false explanations and criminal misrepresentations.
In Tanner, the client hired Tanner to represent him in an attempt to recover
$100,000 from Emery County authorities that had been seized from him. Tanner
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agreed to accept a settlement of one-tenth of the seized amount without his client's
permission. Tanner forged and back dated a special power of attorney. He had his
wife, a notary, notarize the document with an expired seal to lend authenticity. He
used the forged document to obtain the funds from the United States Attorney's
office and then subsequently informed his client that he intended to retain the entire
amount as his fee. Tanner subsequently lied to the FBI about the date and
preparation of the power of attorney and was charged criminally in Federal Court.
Tanner plead guilty to a felony.
Stubbs involved the attorney's participation in a scheme to defraud the State.
He was charged with and plead guilty to a count of communications fraud and
subsequently lied to the Bar when attempting to explain his criminal conduct.
Stubbs' misconduct in this scheme involving the misrepresentations made to the
State as well as the Bar and occurred over a long period of time beginning in 1988
and continuing through 1996.
Each of these cases involved prolonged activities and repeated instances of
misconduct and are clearly distinguishable from and more serious than the
misconduct attributed to Mr. Ennenga.
The Bar complains that the trial court "identified as mitigating circumstances
several factors that either do not meet the criteria set forth in the standards or are
inconsistent with the Court's guidance as to how they should be weighed." (Page 12
Appellant's Brief).
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How does a trial court or for that matter, an appellate court decide that there
are "truly compelling mitigating circumstances?"
This Court attempted to answer that question in In Re Ince, supra:
"Because Rule 6 does not provide any guidance as to how
these circumstances are to be weighed, the process of
applying them is necessarily somewhat subjective.
However, one of the concerns that prompted the adoption
of the present Standards was that under the prior
disciplinary regime, there was no detailed set of guidelines
that defined the sanction generally appropriate for a given
type of misconduct. Thus, discipline under the old regime
had something of an ad hoc quality, and there was the
possibility, of not the probability, that similarly situated
individuals might not receive similar sanctions, (citing
Babilis). Although the new Standards are intended to
preserve a measure of flexibility in assigning sanctions,
the whole basis for their adoption was to avoid the
uncertainty that existed under the old rules. Therefore, we
offer the following guidance as to the application of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances under Rule 6.
To justify a departure from the presumptive level of
discipline set forth in the Standards, the aggravating and
mitigating factors must be significant", at 1237.
This Court went on then to examine the specific claims of mitigation asserted
in Ince and found them to lack compelling significance. If Mr. Ennenga's misconduct
were truly in the context of "similarly situated individuals," then a detailed
examination of his mitigating factors would show that Mr. Ennenga was and is not
"similarly situated" to Babilis, Ince, Tanner or Stubbs.
True, he did misuse a client's funds, but this was single incident with a single
client. It occurred in 1992 after Mr. Ennenga had practiced law for 21 years without
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any similar incident or complaint of dishonestly. Mary Wilson did not file her
complaint until May of 1996, approximately four years after the misconduct. The
formal Bar proceedings were not initiated until August of 1997 and not concluded
until early this year. While Mr. Ennenga has not demonstrated any prejudice by that
delay, he has demonstrated that during the next eight years following his breach of
Mary Wilson's trust, he has not engaged in any similar misconduct.
Mr. Ennenga provided evidence that he has a good reputation with his peers
and clients. Although those who testified acknowledged disappointment upon
learning of Mr. Ennenga's misconduct, they expressed a willingness and ability to
trust him in the future.
Hopefully, Mr. Ennenga's own explanation as to why this happened will
provide this Court with a better understanding as to why the trial court felt there were
compelling mitigating circumstances.
"BY MR. FLORENCE:
Q: Pretty nice things said about you, Mr. Ennenga.
Now, would you care to explain why this conduct
happened?
A. It's complicated, and I have a difficult time
understanding it myself. I've made mistakes. Sometimes
they are cumulative. Maybe it was a mistake to decide to
become a proprietor back in 77 when I did so. Maybe it
was a mistake to think that some of the problems that I
encountered as a proprietor were going to be resolved by
belonging to a small firm. I constantly had times when I
wouldn't do therightbusiness thing. I wouldn't bill people
for the work that I did and generate the money that I
needed to support my family the way I thought they
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wanted to be supported. The billing problems didn't go
away when I got structure through the firm. It almost
became worse in that when I would have to be the focus
of attention at a weekly meeting, that I'd retract from that.
And sometimes I think that when faced with a tough
personal issue, I am reluctant to hit it head on. I know that
I have been unwilling to ever<go to my family and say that
I have this or that financial difficulty. And I've had some.
And that's what I was facing in 1992. I had created a
situation through my business practices where my house
was in foreclosure. Through - through earlier financial
mistakes, whether it be the billing practices or choosing
the wrong clients, I mean, I had people that owed me tons
of money to whom I had sent bills, but were in no position
to pay. Whatever the situation, I was a short while from
having my house sold. I was not in the initial stages of
foreclosure, I was in the latter stages of foreclosure. I was
even beyond the time when my lender had to accept the
delinquency. I - I did not tell my family about this. They
did not know. That is a part of my difficult history. I
usually don't tell. It's not easy for me to confront a
personal weakness, especially to disclose it to my family.
And I did something I've never done before. I had
received a check for JoAnn Wilson that was payable to me
as her attorney, and I used it. I used it, and I fixed the
problem. Now, to say that I used it and that I was going to
turn around and replace it and nobody would be the wiser
doesn't change the act that I misused it. But, in all
honesty, that was what I was thinking, "Nobody would be
hurt and my problem would be resolved," Now, that's not I'm not rationalizing it and I am not justifying it, I am just
trying to explain it. I have tried hard throughout these
proceedings, from the moment that I was confronted with
this, not to try - or not to -not justify what I've done or
pass blame. It's - it's my fault. Now, to say that I didn't
admit it until confronted is true. But these are not easy
things to confront, and I consistently had this idea that I
was either going to collect from someone here or have
something happen over here and I was going to be able to
make it right. I never told JoAnn Wilson that I had used
her money. At the same time, I never told JoAnn Wilson
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that she would never get her money, that her money
somehow had vanished. I basically used the language to
keep her in suspense about what was happening with her
money. But, you know, I didn't send her any letters telling
her that her money was something - somewhere else or
even tell her. I mean Q. You didn't respond at all, did you, to several of
her requests?
A. Only when cornered did I respond to her in any
way.
Q. Why?
A. Number One, I was embarrassed; number two,
I was defenseless; number three, I didn't want to lie to her,
I didn't want to tell her some blatant untruth. I had used
her money. I knew what I had done was wrong. I felt
badly about it. And I kept thinking that around the corner
I'm going to be able to have this conversation with her, I'm
going to be able to tell her that her money is right here. I
remember ~ well, that's neither here nor there. As it turns
out, I didn't have that time when I had that money.
Q. I am sorry, I didn't understand that. You didn't A. As it turns out, the time didn't come when I had
JoAnn Wilson's money available to repay her. I finally got
it done, but there is no question that I did it after I was
forced with the issue. And - and maybe the catalyst was
that I finally found the strength tell my wife what I had
done, and that then gave me the strength to do whatever
it took to find the money to repay her. I mean, the loan
that we made was an extraordinary loan. It was as if I had
to borrowing capacity all during that time and just chose to
ignore it. I went through someone who had been
recommended to me to make it possible so I would have
that money to repay her.
Q. Doesn't just stop there; does it Pete? I am sure
that Ms. Toomey is going to ask about your failure to
respond to the Bar when asked for information regarding
this, and I'm sure that Ms. Toomey is going to talk to you
about the postponement of the time that the first complaint
was filed, at least as it related to some of the other counts,
and allowing you to deal with those before they decided
how they were going to pursue it and your failure to
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promptly respond to discovery and then after this Court
entered an order granting Ms. Toomey attorney fees for
the motion to compel that she had filed, your failure to
timely pay those attorney fees. I mean, that - why have
you persisted in your willingness to come forward and say,
"I've done wrong and I will cooperate and do everything
possible to make it right?"
. . . A. No, I didn't respond because I - for the same
reasons that I had difficulty talking with JoAnn Wilson.
What are you supposed to say when someone tells you
that you have improperly used someone else's money and
you know that you have? What the Bar might have
expected is some kind of letter articulating a defense. I
didn't have a defense. I didn't have an explanation, really,
and I certainly had no justification. I had done what JoAnn
Wilson was alluding to in her complaint. I had taken her
money and I hadn't given it back, or I had used her money
and I hadn't ever given her a reasonable - or a time when
she would expect to get it -get paid."
As for the remorse expressed by Mr. Ennenga:
"That being said, I can tell you unequivocally that as far as
the incident with JoAnn Wilson's money is concerned, that
was an aberration and will always be an aberration. I wish
every day I could undo what I did. But you can't. I've
done it. And now I have to figure out how to live with that.
My choice has been to acknowledge that it was wrong,
and determine that I will not ever make that kind of
mistake again. That's all I can say about that issue.
Q. And you feel that sincerely?
A. I feel it sincerely. That I do - that I don't mistake
a lack of disclosure or publication about my personal
mistakes with - for a lack of remorse or guilt about those
same mistakes. I have felt guilty about what I did with that
money for years before I had to confront it with third
persons, and I have felt additional guilt ever since about
what the fact that - or what the publication of that fact has
done to my family. And I will have to deal with that guilt
forever, because it's not going to just go away. It's not just
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going to somehow disappear. I am not going to make the
same mistake again.
Mr. Ennenga believes the trial court's conclusion that the mitigating factors
outweigh the aggravating factors was correct and supported by the evidence or at
the very least, not "clearly erroneous." "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence
is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.
Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact finder's choice
between them cannot be clearly erroneous." Windsor v. Hinckley Dodge Inc. 79 F.3d
996, 1000 (UT. 10th Cir. 1996).
ISSUE ON CROSS APPEAL
WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING RESPONDENT'S EX
POST FACTO CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT.
The new Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions substantially altered the framework for rendering decisions in attorney
discipline cases and transferred jurisdiction over formal bar complaints of lawyer
misconduct from the Board of Bar Commissioners to the District Court. This is
important since all of Mr. Ennenga's misconduct occurred during the time period that
the prior procedure and case law for imposing attorney discipline was applicable.
As previously stated, it was in In Re Babilis, supra, that this Court first
considered the application of Rule 6 and the weighing of aggravating factors and
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mitigating factors. For the first time, the Supreme Court announced that as a matter
of future principle, the general rule would be that "intentional misappropriation of
client funds will result in disbarment unless the lawyer can demonstrate truly
compelling mitigating circumstances."
Before Babilis, the last reported case under the old Rules was Matter of
Cassitv. 875 P.2d 548 (Utah 1994). Cassitv also involved a lawyer's violation of
Rules which under the new standards would have presumptively required
disbarment. Instead, the Supreme Court issued a public reprimand and a one-year
probation. In Babilis, the Supreme Court made no effort to distinguish its earlier
holding in Cassitv and apparently relied exclusively on the adoption of the new
Standards and Rules for creating its new presumptively appropriate standard. The
application of this standard is inequitable to Mr. Ennenga since the enactment, and
application of the new standard, all occurred after his misconduct.
Babilis specifically talks about the benefits of a more clear test of conditions
for disbarment, but does so prospectively, not retroactively. "Lawyers should be on
notice that an intentional act of misappropriation of a client's funds is an act that
merits disbarment."

at 213.

Since Babilis was decided after Mr. Ennenga's

misconduct that "notice" could have no deterring impact.
It is Mr. Ennenga's position, that prior to the announcement of Babilis, there
were a number of cases of attorney misconduct that involved the misappropriation
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of clients' funds or intentional misconduct equally egregious that did not result in
disbarment. Prior to Babilis, there was no presumptive disbarment applicable for
misuse of clients' funds. In light of the fact that Mr. Ennenga's misconduct occurred
prior to the adoption of the new Rules and Standards, he should be entitled to the
application of the Standards for Discipline that were actually being utilized during the
period of time that his misconduct occurred, not something that was enacted and
ruled upon subsequent to his misconduct.
Over the past several years the Utah State Bar has developed the practice of
publicly reporting all forms of attorney discipline in its Utah Bar Journal. These are
reported in the section referred to as the "Discipline Corner". In reviewing the
published material related to attorney discipline in Utah for the five year period
immediately preceding the Babilis decision, there were 43 attorney suspensions
ranging from as little as three months to as long as three years. For example, on
December 30,1991, Elizabeth Joseph was suspended from the practice of law for
a period of one year for having wrongfully commingled a $20,000.00 death
settlement of her client with her personal funds and failing thereafter to promptly pay
those funds to her client; on January 28, 1992, Jerry Thome was suspended for six
months for accepting a $3,000.00 retainer and thereafter failing to provide
meaningful services to his client; on March 24,1992, Joseph R. Fox was suspended
for 15 months for accepting approximately 83 collection cases on behalf of his client
for which he billed fees in the amount of $9,955.00 and of that amount, $8,203.75
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were fees for work that had not been performed; on May 19,1992, John R. Bucher
was suspended for a period of six months for a variety of misconduct which included
improprieties involving in the use of his trust account; on October 14, 1992, Richard
J. Culbertson was placed on suspension for one year after previously failing to
comply with terms and conditions of probation which had been imposed earlier in
connection with a private reprimand in connection with his having comingled client
funds, failing to communicate with clients and writing checks on an account with
insufficient funds; on November 3,1992, Harold R. Stevens was suspended for one
year with two years of supervised probation for failing to file a responsive pleading
to a complaint wherein $149,000.00 was allegedly owed to a lender thereby resulting
in a default judgment against his client which could not ultimately be set aside
because of Mr. Stevens' inaction; on February 11, 1993, George S. Clark was
suspended for one year for failing to provide legal services to a client who had paid
a retainer and in a second complaint, settled a personal injury case but thereafter
failed to pay the existing medical bills as he had agreed to do causing his client to
be exposed to $5,000.00 continuing medical obligations; on November 9, 1993,
Donald E. Elkins was suspended for one year for falsely representing to his clients
that he had filed a civil suit on their behalf and that a judgment had been entered in
their favor when in fact, no suit had ever been filed.
During this same time period, 83 attorneys received either an admonition or
private reprimand. It should be noted that with the adoption of the new standards of
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discipline, a private reprimand was eliminated and the only form of private discipline
available to the Bar is an admonition. It is interesting to note however, the summary
description of attorney misconduct which resulted in these private forms of discipline,
for example:
a.

A conviction of attempting to distribute cocaine;

b.

Refusing to return clients' money after providing no meaningful services;

c.

Patronizing a prostitute;

d.

Failing to provide vital information to the Court which had been given

to the lawyer from his client resulting in damage to the client;
e.

Lack of diligence in resolving disputes adversely affecting clients;

f.

Failing to cooperate with the Bar's investigation regarding clients'

complaints of failing to provide meaningful services;
g.

Conflict of interests in representing different parties in substantially

related proceedings;
h.

Borrowing a portion of settlement proceeds from a client in a personal

injury case without advising the client of his right to have a disinterested attorney
review the transaction and without obtaining the client's written consent to that
transaction and thereafter failing to repay the loan to the client; (emphasis added)
I.

Physically assaulting the opposing party's attorney outside the

courthouse;
j.

Using a trust account to conduct personal business transactions; and
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k.

Charging an excessive fee in a personal injury case where it was

determined that the contingent fee agreement was inappropriate and the fee should
be measured by other standards.
During that same time period, there were 14 public reprimands. Some of the
conduct involved for that sanction included:
a.

Drafting Wills for a client wherein the attorney and members of his

family were included as beneficiaries in the decedent's estate and were not related
by blood or marriage to the decedent;
b.

Representing individuals and corporate clients and at the same time

representing an individual whose interests were adverse to the other clients. A
specific finding of misconduct and conflict was determined by U.S. District Court
Judge Sam;
c.

Unilaterally abrogating a fee agreement and after having previously

forgiven a sizeable fee, and electing to apply the entire amount recovered on behalf
of his clients towards a fee previously forgiven; and
d.

Settling a client's personal injury case and executing the settlement

documents on behalf of a client without obtaining the client's approval.
The four reported appellate decisions regarding attorney discipline in Utah
immediately preceding Babilis include:
Matter of Discipline of Schwenke, 849 P.2d 573 (Utah 1993). Here, the
attorney was the subject of two complaints where he took money and failed to
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provide meaningful services for which he got a one-year supervised probation for
neglect. Thereafter, he failed to make required restitution and then filed bankruptcy
on the obligation. A subsequent complaint was filed alleging the attorney initiated
a bankruptcy for a client to prevent foreclosure on property that the attorney had
purchased from the client. The Bar subsequently brought an Order to Show Cause
for the attorney's failure to abide by the prior discipline and they recommended
disbarment. The Supreme Court found that the Bar's service of the Order to Show
Cause notice was deficient and that the attorney's subsequent misconduct was not
sufficient grounds for disbarment.
In a subsequent action against this same attorney involving a misappropriation
of $100,000.00 in a client's personal injury case, the Supreme Court did affirm a
recommendation of disbarment. See In Re Schwenke, 865 P.2d 1350 (Utah 1993).
In the Matter of Complaint Against Smith, 872 P.2d 447 (Utah 1994), the
Supreme Court held that disbarment was not mandatory where a conviction for a
crime involving moral turpitude was involved. In this particular case, the attorney
had forged his wife's signature on an Acceptance of Service and Waiver in a divorce
action and recorded the false instruments with the court.

The attorney then

attempted to rectify the consequences of his actions and sought psychological
counseling. The Supreme Court held that the misconduct warranted a one-year
suspension.
And finally, as previously referenced, the case of Matter of Cassitv, 875 P.2d
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548 (Utah 1994). Mr. Cassity failed to remit to his client a rightful portion of
settlement proceeds. He also conspired to commit a fraud on the bankruptcy court.
The hearing panel concluded that Cassity had violated Rule 8.4(c) by engaging in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, conduct which
under the current rules would be subject to the presumptive imposition of disbarment
as the appropriate level of discipline. As aggravating factors, the panel considered
Cassity's substantial experience in the practice of law and his refusal to
acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct. Initially, the panel recommended
that Cassity be publicly reprimanded and placed on probation for six months.
However, the board subsequently modified that recommendation and requested a
one-year suspension.
In reviewing the recommended punishment, the Supreme Court pointed out
that conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation are elements
for the sanction of disbarment, as well as the elements for reprimand. Under
disbarment, the dishonesty must "seriously adversely reflect on the lawyer's fitness
to practice law" while under the standards for reprimand, the dishonesty is only of
a nature that it "adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law". They held
that the appropriate sanction would be a public reprimand and a one-year probation.
It is the Cassity case that most closely resembles Mr. Ennenga's facts. If the Cassity
standard for disbarment were utilized in Mr. Ennenga's case, it is doubtful the Bar
would be pursuing this appeal. Discipline actually being imposed contemporaneous
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with Mr. Ennenga's misconduct would be similar or less serious than that already
imposed on Mr. Ennenga. By utilizing post 1993 disciplinary standards, the Bar is
violating his constitutional right to be protected against ex post facto application of
the new Rules.
In the criminal context, it has been held that when the legislature alters the
penalty for a crime after a defendant has allegedly committed the crime but before
sentencing, the new statute - - the one in effect at the time of sentencing - - is
applied so long as it does not raise a Constitutional question of being an ex post
facto law by reason of increasing the punishment. Belt v. Turner 483 P.2d 425, 425426 (Utah 1971).
If a statutory amendment increases the punishment, the sentence should be
determined according to the law in effect on the date the crime was committed.
Smith v. Cook 803 P.2d 788, 792 (Utah 1990). These rules of law were reaffirmed
in the recent case of State v. Dominauez 992 P.2d 995 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).
It is anticipated that the Office of Professional Conduct will claim that the
revised disciplinary rules and disciplinary adjudications are civil proceedings and not
subject to principles of criminal law. Mr. Ennenga respectfully disagrees.
The issue of whether a civil penalty is subject to constitutional arguments
normally reserved for criminal offenses was discussed in the recent Utah Supreme
Court certiorari review of State v. Davis 972 P.2d 388 (Utah 1998). Davis held that
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in rem property forfeitures were remedial civil sanctions, and at least in the facts of
that case, was not a aiminal punishment so as to subject it to a constitutional claim
of double jeopardy. Davis, however, discussed at length United State Supreme
Court cases which addressed the issue as to whether a civil penalty is so punitive
in either purpose or effect so as to constitute a criminal penalty and thereby make
it subject to constitutional arguments typically reserved for the realm of criminal law.
Davis cited with approval United States v. Ward 448 US 242 (1980) and Kennedy
v. Mendoza-Martinez 372 US 144 (1963). Ward relied upon Mendoza-Martinez
which set out a non-exclusive list of criteria for determining whether a nominally civil
statute actually prescribed a criminal penalty. That test was:
"Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will
promote the traditional aims of punishment - - retribution and
deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime,
whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected
is assignable for it, and whether it appears excess in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned."
Davis at 390.
Evaluating each of these criteria, it is submitted that Mr. Ennenga's case
meets these tests.
1.

Attorney discipline has historically been regarded by the public and the

legal profession as punishment, at least when sanctions of suspension or disbarment
are imposed.
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2.

The Court has found that Mr. Ennenga's misconduct which OPC claims

justifies disbarment involved scienter.
3.

To disbar Mr. Ennenga will promote the traditional aims of punishment -

retribution and deterrence.
4.

Mr. Ennenga's behavior has been characterized by OPC as a crime and

indeed this Court has concluded as a matter of law that Mr. Ennenga violated Rule
8.4(b) "commit a criminal act' and (c) "engage in conduct involving dishonesty".
The next criteria, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be
connected is assignable, was addressed in Babilis. Admittedly, in Babilis, the
Supreme Court said that a restriction on, or withdrawal of, the right to practice law
as a sanction for violation of professional ethical standards is remedial in nature and
that attorney discipline was therefore neither punitive nor a criminal penalty.
That statement in Babilis was conclusionary in nature, made before the
decision of State v. Davis and did not involve the analysis or tests adopted by the
United State Supreme Court in Mendoza-Martinez. Moreover, Babilis did not
address the disparity in punishment for similar misconduct prior to the adoption of
the 1993 Standards and the new Standard adopted by Babilis in imposing attorney
discipline.
In a purely civil context, §68-3-3, Utah Code Annotated provides that "No part
of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so declared." While the
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adoption of the new standards of discipline was not a legislative act, the same
principle of non-retroactive application should apply.
CONCLUSION
Since all of Mr. Ennenga's misconduct occurred prior to the adoption of the
current Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline, the trial court should have applied
the earlier rules and case law interpreting those rules. Had that occurred, the level
of discipline imposed on Mr. Ennenga would likely have been less severe. Failure
to apply the earlier rules, violates Mr. Ennenga's ex post facto protections and
retroactively imposes standards that did not specifically provide for retroactive
application when they were adopted.
To the extent that the Court relied on the new Rules, each factor was properly
evaluated and the mitigating factors justified departure from presumptive disbarment.
Respectfully submitted this ^\ 1 a^-dav^of November, 2000.

Brian R. Florence
Attorney for Respondent/
Appellee/Cross-Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am employed by Brian R. Florence, attorney for
respondent/appellee/cross-appellant, that I served the attached Reply and Cross
Appeal Brief of Appellee/Cross Appellant herein, upon the parties by placing two true
and correct copies thereof in an envelope and causing the same to be mailed, first
class, postage prepaid, on the \[p

day of November, 2000, to the following:

Kate A. Toomey
Attorney for Utah State Bar
645 South 200 East, Suite 205
Salt Lake City UT 84111-3834

Jo/\f\n T. Florence, Legal Assistant
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ADDENDUM

1.

Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law of trial
held January 18, 2000.

2.

Memorandum Decision re entered April 3, 2000 re: sanctions hearing
held March 28, 2000.

3.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

4.

Order of Suspension.
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DIS
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UT;

In the Matter of the Discipline
of:

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO. 970905496

PETER M. ENNENGA, #0999
Respondent.

At the conclusion of trial on January 11, 2000, the Court took
this matter under advisement and now issues its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The respondent is an attorney licensed to practice law in

the state of Utah since 1970.
2.

In approximately the spring of 1991 JoAnn Wilson retained

the respondent to collect various amounts owed her, including a sum
in the approximate amount of $18,000 owed to her business by Thomas
E. Soderberg.
3.

Respondent collected $18,000 from Thomas E. Soderberg on

or about May 21, 1992.
4.

On approximately May 26, 1992, Wilson requested that

Ennenga hold the $18,000 in an interest-bearing escrow account.
5.

Respondent never deposited said money in any trust or

escrow account, but in October of 1992 deposited a portion of

ENNENGA MATTER
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Wilson's money into his personal checking account, retaining the
balance in the form of a cashier's check.
6.

Respondent spent all of Wilson's money for personal

purposes.
7.

In

April,

1993,

Wilson's

accountant

requested

an

accounting of the money from respondent, and respondent failed to
provide it.
8.

Wilson made

several attempts to contact

respondent

regarding her money and respondent either failed to respond or
promised payment, which he failed to do.
9.

Wilson filed an informal Complaint against respondent

with the OPC on May 30, 1996.
10.

Respondent did not pay Wilson her money until June of

11.

Respondent used his position as Wilson's attorney and

1997.

fiduciary to obtain possession of Wilson's money.
12.

Respondent breached his fiduciary duty and converted

Wilson's funds for his own use without her permission or knowledge.
13.

Taner Yarbil retained respondent on June 3, 1993 on a

contingency fee basis to represent him in a civil action.
14.

Respondent requested a retainer of $2,250 of which Yarbil

paid respondent $750.

O l^v

ENNENGA MATTER
15.

PAGE 3

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Respondent filed a Complaint on Yarbil's behalf and

served one of two defendants in said case, but stopped any actions
to prosecute said case and failed to inform Yarbil that he was no
longer going to pursue the matter.
16.

Yarbil filed an informal Complaint with the OPC on April

15 1995.
17.

Beginning in the late 1970's respondent represented

Rodney Glover in various matters, including part of a divorce
proceeding.
18.

Respondent's representation of Glover enabled him to

learn certain details regarding Glover's financial condition.
19.

On January 29, 1987 respondent obtained from Glover

$7,500 in the form of a loan.
20.

Glover received only a form Promissory Note signed by

Ennenga, there was no security for the Note, and Ennenga did not
provide Glover any information regarding Ennenga's ability to repay
the Note.
21.

Ennenga did not advise Glover to consult with independent

counsel regarding the transaction, and Glover did not consent in
writing to the loan arrangement with Ennenga.
22.

Ennenga failed to timely repay the loan.

^u
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Glover filed suit against Ennenga seeking payment, and

obtained a Default Judgment against him on March 7, 1989, which
Ennenga did not pay.
24.

In 1992 Glover retained the services of Raymond Farrell

to attempt to collect the money on the Note.
25.

The attorney who represented Glover in the lawsuit in

which the Judgment was obtained on March 7, 1989 explained to
Glover that Ennenga had violated certain Rules of Professional
Conduct.
26.

Glover filed an informal Complaint with the OPC on

February 16, 1993.
27.

The OPC sent Ennenga requests for information in response

to Wilson's Complaint, Yarbil's Complaint and Glover's Complaint.
Ennenga failed to timely respond to any requests for information
from the OPC.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This Court has already entered Summary Judgment against

the defendant on Counts 8 and 13 of the First Amended Complaint and
concludes that respondent violated Rule 8.1(b) of the Rules of
Professional Conduct, and in said Summary Judgment the Court finds
that respondent violated Rules 1.15, 8.4(b)(c), 1.4 and 8.1 with
respect to the foregoing Findings of Fact.

•*rk
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The Court finds that the statute of limitations bars the

OPC Complaint against Ennenga on the Glover matter.
Counsel are to contact the Court and arrange a sanctions
hearing pursuant to Rule 11(f) of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline
and Disability.
Dated this

(o day of January, 2000.

%T&fsKl
STEPHEN L. HENRIO
DISTRICT COURT JUi

* ? * $! *S3!«?S ?:S<<
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this
January, 2000:

Kate A. Toomey
Assistant Counsel
Office of Professional Conduct
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Brian R. Florence
Attorney for Respondent
5790 Harrison Blvd.
Ogden, Utah
84403

day of
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAI/DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Discipline
of:

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO. 970905496

PETER M. ENNENGA, #0999
Respondent.

This matter was tried on January 11, 2000, after which the
Court took the matter under advisement.

Prior to trial, Summary

Judgment had been entered against respondent on Counts 8 and 13 of
the First Amended

Complaint, concluding

that respondent had

violated Rule 8.1(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
January

18, 2000,

the

Court

entered

Findings

of

Fact

On
and

Conclusions of Law, concluding that the respondent violated Rule
1.15, Safekeeping Property; 8.4(b), Committing a Criminal Act that
Reflects Adversely on the Lawyerfs Honesty; 8.4(c), Engaging in
Conduct Involving Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit or Misrepresentation;
1.4, Failing to Communicate with Client; and 8.1, additional
conclusions of respondents Failure to Provide Information to the
Office of Professional Conduct.

Following the Findings and

Conclusions and after a waiver with respect to the time for a
sanctions hearing, a hearing was held on March 28, 2000 regarding
the issue of sanctions. The Court took the matter under advisement
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and now issues this Memorandum Decision with respect to said
sanctions.
Pursuant to Rule 3 of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions, generally the following factors should be considered:
a.

The duty violated;

b.

The lawyerfs mental state;

c.

The potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's

misconduct; and
d.

The existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.

The specific duties violated by Mr. Ennenga with respect to
8.1

were

in three

separate

instances

he

failed

to provide

information to the OPC through the normal discovery process in this
case.

The duty that he violated with respect to Rule 1.4 was in

failing to communicate with a client named Yarbil. After taking a
partial retainer of $750 and filing a Complaint, Mr. Ennenga failed
to continue to work on the matter and failed to inform Mr. Yarbil
of that fact.

With respect to Rules 1.15, 8.4(b) and 8.4(c), Mr.

Ennenga collected the sum of $18,000 for his client, Ms. Wilson, in
May of 1992. Ms. Wilson requested that Mr. Ennenga hold it in his
interest-bearing

trust account because she was going through

several important changes in her life and felt that the money would
be better kept by her attorney.

Mr. Ennenga never deposited the

money into a trust account, but instead deposited part in his
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personal checking account and had part converted into a cashierfs
check, all of which he took and used for himself. At least part of
the money was used to prevent Mr. Ennenga's family home from being
foreclosed for failure to make mortgage payments.
The reason that Mr. Ennenga misappropriated Ms. Wilson's money
was that he had a history of poor business practices in connection
with his law practice which resulted in his personal financial
situation being such that he could not make his mortgage payments
when due. This objective financial situation was coupled with Mr.
Ennenga's subjective inability to inform his wife and children that
he was not meeting his financial obligations.

Mr. Ennenga knew

that Ms. Wilson was not going to require immediate payment of her
funds to her, and he stalled her when she started requesting the
funds by avoiding discussion of the fund's whereabouts or the
specific time that he would remit them to her.

Mr. Ennenga

testified that he didn't want to lie to Ms. Wilson, but he didn't
want to admit that he had taken the funds and no longer had them
either. He further testified that he had many thousands of dollars
outstanding in the form of accounts receivable and from the time
that he took the $18,000 he believed he would be able to replace it
with interest and pay Ms. Wilson her funds when she required them.
Of course, this was not the case and he only repaid her in 1997
after her informal complaint against him was filed in 1996 and she
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had also retained an attorney to take action against Mr. Ennenga
for the money.
Mr. Yarbil did not testify and no evidence was presented to
show that he suffered an injury as a result of Mr. Ennengafs
misconduct. Mr. Ennenga paid Ms. Wilson the sum of $30,000 in 1997
covering her principal, plus interest and attorneyfs fees, and when
she testified, she did not claim any further injury.
Rule 4 of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions states
that

absent

aggravating

or

mitigating

circumstances,

upon

application of the factors set forth above from Rule 3, that
sanctions are generally appropriate as follows: when a lawyer
engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d),
(e) or (f), disbarment is the presumptive sanction. Mr. Ennenga's
misappropriation of Ms. Wilsonfs funds clearly falls into Rule
8.4(a) . He acted with the intent to benefit himself. Said conduct
also falls within Rule 4.2(b), because the misappropriation of
funds was serious criminal conduct and involved misrepresentation
to Ms. Wilson and misappropriation of her funds.
violations fall either under Rule 4.3

or 4.4.

The other
Mr. Ennenga

knowingly engaged in the misconduct and caused potential injury to
the legal system, and interfered with the pending disciplinary
action against him.

*&<•*
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Unbeknownst to the OPC, Mr. Ennenga had received two prior
reprimands which he acknowledged at trial.

Said reprimands were

for failure to do timely filings in the late 1980 f s that did not
involve money.
The presumptive

sanction under Rule 4.2

for

respondents

misappropriation of Ms. Wilson's money is disbarment.
The next step in the analysis of the appropriate sanction is
consideration of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances set
forth in Rule 6.

In In re: Babilis, 951 P.2d 215, the Supreme

Court explained that, "To justify departure from the presumptive
level of discipline set forth in the standards the aggravating and
mitigating factors must be significant.11
Rule 6.2 provides that aggravating circumstances may include:
(a)

Prior record of discipline.

There was prior discipline,

but not of the same nature as the Wilson misconduct.
(b)

Dishonest or selfish motive. Mr. Ennengafs act was to

benefit himself and his family.
(c)

A pattern of misconduct.

The Court does not find a

pattern of misconduct in this matter, excepting his reluctance to
participate in the disciplinary process against him.
(d)

Multiple offenses.

While consideration of the rules

violated would seem to indicate multiple offenses, it is the trial
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court 1 s perspective that there were minor offenses and one standalone serious offense, namely, the Wilson matter.
(e)

Obstruction

intentionally

of

failing

to

disciplinary authority.
(f)

the

disciplinary

comply

with

rules

proceeding
or

orders

of

by
the

Mr. Ennenga admits this.

Submission of false evidence, false statements, or other

deceptive practices during the disciplinary process.

This has

apparently not occurred.
(g)

Refusal

to

acknowledge

the

wrongful

nature

of

the

misconduct involved, either to the client or to the disciplinary
authority.

Mr. Ennenga has admitted the wrongful nature of the

misconduct, has explained his involvement completely, and expresses
sincere remorse and has been remorseful since the misconduct took
place.

He, however, did not openly admit any of these things until

shortly before the trial.
(h)

Vulnerability of victim.

Neither Mr. Yarbil nor Ms.

Wilson were particularly vulnerable. Mr. Wilson, in fact, made the
misconduct too easy.
(i)

Substantial

experience

in the practice of

law.

Mr.

Ennenga has practiced law for some 30 years, but it was only 21
years to the date of the misappropriation of funds.
(j)

Lack of good faith effort to make restitution or to

rectify the consequences of the misconduct involved.

Mr. Ennenga
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has made full restitution, but did not do so until he was under
duress.
(k)

Illegal

substances.

conduct,

including

the

use

of

controlled

The only illegal conduct that occurred here was the

misappropriation of funds.
The mitigating circumstances set forth in Rule 6.3 are as
follows:
(a)

Absence of a prior record of discipline.

As stated

above, there is a prior record of discipline, but less significant
than 8.4 and not of the same sort of misconduct.
(b)

Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive.

Not the case

(c)

Personal

Ennenga

here.

suffering personal

or

emotional

problems.

Mr.

and emotional problems as a result

was

of his

inability to meet his regular financial obligations.
(d)

Timely

good

faith

effort

to make restitution

or to

rectify the consequences of the misconduct involved. Mr. Ennengafs
effort was not particularly timely, but he did completely rectify
the consequences to Ms. Wilson.
(e)

Full

and

free

disclosure

to

the

client

or

the

disciplinary authority prior to the discovery of any misconduct, or
cooperative attitude toward proceedings.

This did not occur.
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(f)

Inexperience in the practice of the law. Not applicable.

(g)

Good character or reputation.

standing

Two attorneys in good

and two clients of Mr. Ennenga's testified that they

believed despite the facts of the instant case, that Mr. Ennenga
was a fine attorney with an outstanding reputation for honesty.
(h)

Physical disability.

(i)

Mental disability or impairment.

(j)

Unreasonable

delay

Not applicable.

in

the

Not applicable.

disciplinary

proceedings

provided that the respondent did not substantially contribute to
the delay and provided further that the respondent has demonstrated
prejudice resulting from the delay.
in this matter.

There was a significant delay

While Ms. Wilson did not file her

complaint

against the respondent until 1996, other complaints with respect to
other matters referred to above were filed in 1993.

The OPC has

been conducting an investigation into this matter since 1993, and
only filed its Complaint in August of 1997, and its First Amended
Complaint

in September of 1997.

Mr. Ennenga certainly didn't

facilitate moving the case forward on a faster track in his refusal
to provide information to the Bar through the discovery process,
but the delay is attributable as much or more to the OPC as it is
to Mr.

Ennenga.

Mr.

Ennenga

has

not

demonstrated

prejudice

resulting from the delay.

3iv

(k)
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Interim reform.

Mr. Ennenga has not had any valid

complaints filed against him regarding misconduct after 1992.
(1)

Imposition of other penalties or sanctions. The Court is

aware of no other penalties or sanctions Mr. Ennenga has suffered.
(m) Remorse. As stated above, Mr. Ennenga is very remorseful
and has been since the 1992 misconduct.
(n) Remoteness of prior offenses.

Prior offenses are not

particularly significant, but are also not particularly remote in
time.
The

mitigating

circumstances

outweigh

the

aggravating

circumstances. In considering appropriate sanctions, the Court ha
reviewed the Tanner. 346 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, 960 P. 2d 399 (1998,
Utah Lexis 40); Stubbs, 363 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 974 P.2d 296 (1999,
Utah Lexis 20); Babilis, 332 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 951 P.2d 207 (1997,
Utah Lexis 108); and Ince, 340 Utah Adv. Rep. 53, 957 P.2d 1233
(1998, Utah Lexis 17), matters, wherein trial courts recommended
sanctions less than disbarment and the Supreme Court held that
disbarment was appropriate. Weighing the misconduct of Mr. Ennenga
against the misconduct of Tanner, Stubbs, Babilis and Ince shows a
significant difference in the seriousness of the conduct, both as
to the number of incidents, the motive of the attorney, and the
time elapsed between misconduct and sanction.
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Mr. Ennenga makes an ex post facto argument analogizing to
criminal punishment. The Court finds that is contrary to case law
and not persuasive. These cases involved prolonged activities and
repeated instances of serious misconduct.
Mr. Ennenga should be suspended from the practice of law f**>
a period of six months, and when he is readmitted to practice for
a period not less than three years, he should have the supervision
of an experienced attorney, and he should also participate in
psychological or psychiatric counseling prior to practicing law
again.
Dated this J^ day of April, 2000.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this
April, 2000:

Kate A. Toomey
Assistant Counsel
Office of Professional Conduct
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Brian R. Florence
Attorney for Respondent
5790 Harrison Blvd.
Ogden, Utah
84403
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Kate A. Toomey, #6446
Assistant Counsel
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

(801)531-9110
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the
Discipline of:

i
|

PETER M. ENNENGA, #0999
Respondent.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil No. 970905496
Judge Stephen L. Henriod

This matter was tried on January 11, 2000, after which the Court took the matter
under advisement.

Prior to trial, Summary Judgment had been entered against

respondent on Counts 8 and 13 of the First Amended Complaint, concluding that
respondent had violated Rule 8.1(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. On January
18, 2000, the Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, concluding that
the respondent violated Rule 1.15, Safekeeping Property; 8.4(b), Committing a Criminal
Act that Reflects Adversely on the Lawyer's Honesty; 8.4(c), Engaging in Conduct
Involving Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit or Misrepresentation; 1.4, Failing to Communicate
with Client; and 8.1, additional conclusions of respondent's Failure to Provide
Information to the Office of Professional Conduct.

Following the Findings and

Conclusions and after a waiver with respect to the time for a sanctions hearing, a

hearing was held on March 28, 2000 regarding the issue of sanctions. The Court took
the matter under advisement and hereby makes the following Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law:
Pursuant to Rule 3 of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, generally
the following factors should be considered:
a.

The duty violated;

b.

The lawyer's mental state;

c.

The potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and

d.

The existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.

The specific duties violated by Mr. Ennenga with respect to 8.1 were in three
separate instances he failed to provide information to the OPC through the normal
discovery process in this case. The duty that he violated with respect to Rule 1.4 was in
failing to communicate with a client named Yarbil. After taking a partial retainer of $750
and filing a Complaint, Mr. Ennenga failed to continue to work on the matter and failed
to inform Mr. Yarbil of that fact. With respect to Rules 1.15, 8.4(b) and 8.4(c), Mr.
Ennenga collected the sum of $18,000 for his client, Ms. Wilson, in May of 1992. Ms.
Wilson requested that Mr. Ennenga hold it in his interest-bearing trust account because
she was going through several important changes in her life and felt that the money
would be better kept by her attorney. Mr. Ennenga never deposited the money into a
trust account, but instead deposited part in his personal checking account and had part
converted into a cashier's check, all of which he took and used for himself. At least part

2

of the money was used to prevent Mr. Ennenga's family home from being foreclosed for
failure to make mortgage payments.
The reason that Mr. Ennenga misappropriated Ms. Wilson's money was that he
had a history of poor business practices in connection with his law practice which
resulted in his personal financial situation being such that he could not make his
mortgage payments when due. This objective financial situation was coupled with Mr.
Ennenga's subjective inability to inform his wife and children that he was not meeting
his financial obligations. Mr. Ennenga knew that Ms. Wilson was not going to require
immediate payment of her funds to her, and he stalled her when she started requesting
the funds by avoiding discussion of the funds' whereabouts or the specific time that he
would remit them to her. Mr. Ennenga testified that he didn't want to lie to Ms. Wilson,
but he didn't want to admit that he had taken the funds and no longer had them either.
He further testified that he had many thousands of dollars outstanding in the form of
accounts receivable and from the time that he took the $18,000 he believed he would
be able to replace it with interest and pay Ms. Wilson her funds when she required
them. Of course, this was not the case and he only repaid her in 1997 after her informal
complaint against him was filed in 1996 and she had also retained an attorney to take
action against Mr. Ennenga for the money.
Mr. Yarbil did not testify and no evidence was presented to show that he suffered
an injury as a result of Mr. Ennenga's misconduct. Mr. Ennenga paid Ms. Wilson the
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sum of $30,000 in 1997 covering her principal, plus interest and attorney's fees, and
when she testified, she did not claim any further injury.
Rule 4 of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions states that absent
aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set forth above
from Rule 3, that sanctions are generally appropriate as follows: when a lawyer
engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e) or (f), disbarment
is the presumptive sanction. Mr. Ennenga's misappropriation of Ms. Wilson's funds
clearly falls into Rule 8.4(a). He acted with the intent to benefit himself. Said conduct
also falls within Rule 4.2(b), because the misappropriation of funds was serious criminal
conduct and involved misrepresentation to Ms. Wilson and misappropriation of her
funds. The other violations fall either under Rule 4.3 or 4.4. Mr. Ennenga knowingly
engaged in the misconduct and caused potential injury to the legal system, and
interfered with the pending disciplinary action against him.
Unbeknownst to the OPC, Mr. Ennenga had received two prior reprimands which
he acknowledged at trial. Said reprimands were for failure to do timely filings in the late
1980's that did not involve money.
The presumptive sanction under Rule 4.2 for respondent's misappropriation of
Ms. Wilson's money is disbarment.
The next step in the analysis of the appropriate sanction is consideration of the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances set forth in Rule 6. In In re: Babilis, 951 P.2d
215, the Supreme Court explained that, "To justify departure from the presumptive level

4

of discipline set forth in the standards the aggravating and mitigating factors must be
significant."
Rule 6.2 provides that aggravating circumstances may include:
(a) Prior record of discipline. There was prior discipline, but not of the same
nature as the Wilson misconduct.
(b) Dishonest or selfish motive. Mr. Ennenga's act was to benefit himself and
his family.
(c) A pattern of misconduct. The Court does not find a pattern of misconduct in
this matter, excepting his reluctance to participate in the disciplinary process against
him.
(d)

Multiple offenses. While consideration of the rules violated would seem to

indicate multiple offenses, it is the trial court's perspective that there were minor
offenses and one stand-alone serious offense, namely, the Wilson matter.
(e)

Obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply

with the rules or orders of the disciplinary authority. Mr. Ennenga admits this.
(f)

Submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive

practices during the disciplinary process. This has apparently not occurred.
(g)

Refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct involved,

either to the client or to the disciplinary authority.

Mr. Ennenga has admitted the

wrongful nature of the misconduct, has explained his involvement completely, and
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expresses sincere remorse and has been remorseful since the misconduct took place.
He, however, did not openly admit any of these things until shortly before the trial.
(h)

Vulnerability of victim. Neither Mr. Yarbil nor Ms. Wilson were particularly

vulnerable. Ms. Wilson, in fact, made the misconduct too easy.
(i)

Substantial experience in the practice of law. Mr. Ennenga has practiced

law for some 30 years, but it was only 21 years to the date of the misappropriation of
funds.
(j)

Lack of good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences

of the misconduct involved. Mr. Ennenga has made full restitution, but did not do so
until he was under duress.
(k)

Illegal conduct, including the use of controlled substances.

The only

illegal conduct that occurred here was the misappropriation of funds.
The mitigating circumstances set forth in Rule 6.3 are as follows:
(a)

Absence of a prior record of discipline. As stated above, there is a prior

record of discipline, but less significant that 8.4 and not of the same sort of misconduct.
(b)

Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive. Not the case here.

(c)

Personal or emotional problems. Mr. Ennenga was suffering personal and

emotional problems as a result of his inability to meet his regular financial obligations.
(d)

Timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences

of the misconduct involved. Mr. Ennenga's effort was not particularly timely, but he did
completely rectify the consequences to Ms. Wilson.
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(e)

Full and free disclosure to the client or the disciplinary authority prior to the

discovery of any misconduct, or cooperative attitude toward proceedings. This did not
occur.
(f)

Inexperience in the practice of the law. Not applicable.

(g)

Good character or reputation. Two attorneys in good standing and two

clients of Mr. Ennenga's testified that they believed despite the facts of the instant case,
that Mr. Ennenga was a fine attorney with an outstanding reputation for honesty.
(h)

Physical disability. Not applicable.

(i)

Mental disability or impairment. Not applicable.

(j)

Unreasonable delay in the disciplinary proceedings provided that the

respondent did not substantially contribute to the delay and provided further that the
respondent has demonstrated prejudice resulting from the delay.

There was a

significant delay in this matter. While Ms. Wilson did not file her complaint against the
respondent until 1996, other complaints with respect to other matters referred to above
were filed in 1993. The OPC has been conducting an investigation into this matter
since 1993, and only filed its Complaint in August of 1997, and its First Amended
Complaint in September of 1997. Mr. Ennenga certainly didn't facilitate moving the
case forward on a faster track in his refusal to provide information to the Bar through the
discovery process, but the delay is attributable as much or more to the OPC as it is to
Mr. Ennenga. Mr. Ennenga has not demonstrated prejudice resulting from the delay.
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(k)

Interim reform.

Mr. Ennenga has not had any valid complaints filed

against him regarding misconduct after 1992.
(I)

Imposition of other penalties or sanctions. The Court is aware of no other

penalties or sanctions Mr. Ennenga has suffered.
(m)

Remorse. As stated above, Mr. Ennenga is very remorseful and has been

since the 1992 misconduct.
(n)

Remoteness of prior offenses.

Prior offenses are not particularly

significant, but are also not particularly remote in time.
The mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances.

In

considering appropriate sanctions, the Court has reviewed the Tanner, 346 Utah Adv.
Rep. 20, 960 P.2d 399 (1998, Utah Lexis 40); Stubbs, 363 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 974 P.2d
296 (1999, Utah Lexis 20); Babilis. 332 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 951 P.2d 207 (1997, Utah
Lexis 108); and Ince, 340 Utah Adv. Rep. 53, 957 P.2d 1233 (1998, Utah Lexis 17),
matters, wherein trial courts recommended sanctions less than disbarment and the
Supreme Court held that disbarment was appropriate. Weighing the misconduct of Mr.
Ennenga against the misconduct of Tanner, Stubbs, Babilis and Ince shows a
significant difference in the seriousness of the conduct, both as to the number of
incidents, the motive of the attorney, and the time elapsed between misconduct and
sanction.
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Mr. Ennenga makes an ex post facto argument analogizing to criminal
punishment. The Court finds that is contrary to case law and not persuasive. These
cases involved prolonged activities and repeated instances of serious misconduct.
Mr. Ennenga should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six
months, and when he is readmitted to practice for a period not less than three years, he
should have the supervision of an experienced attorney, and he should also participate
in psychological or psychiatric counseling prior to practicing law again.
DATED this

[ _ day of £pril,'2000.
BY THE COURT:

^c=r-^

''ui. ...

The Honorable Stephen t ^ v ^ M o c l
District Court Judge \ ^••.. # ~~..

Brian R. Florence
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on April ^ ) , 2000, I caused to be mailed via United States
first-class mail, postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to:
Brian R. Florence
Attorney for Respondent
5790 Harrison Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84403
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Tab 4

Kate A. Toomey, #6446
Assistant Counsel
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

(801)531-9110
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ORDER: SUSPENSION

In the Matter of the
Discipline of:
PETER M. ENNENGA, #0999
Respondent.

I

Civil No. 970905496

i

Judge Stephen L. Henriod

The Court, having reviewed all pleadings and papers filed in this matter, having
conducted a sanctions hearing on March 28, 2000 for the purpose of receiving
testimony and exhibits, having heard the argument of counsel, having entered its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and otherwise being fully advised in the
premises,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent, Peter M. Ennenga, is suspended
rom the practice of law for a period of six months.

It is further ordered that when Mr. Ennenga is readmitted to practice, for a period
not less than three years he shall have the supervision of an experienced attorney.
It is further ordered that Mr. Ennenga shall participate in psychological or
psychiatric counseling prior to practicing law again.
DATED this

(_ day of ^pril/2000.
BY THE COURT:

The Honorable Stephen L. HejfcQ6>Ui
District Court Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Brian R. Florence
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on April 2$, 2000, I caused to be mailed via United States
first-class mail, postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER:
SUSPENSION to:
Brian R. Florence
Attorney for Respondent
5790 Harrison Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84403
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